Pauline Hanson wants power to sack the judges who are locked onto the bench until they’re 70. u1
The Gavel and the Ballot Box: Inside One Nation’s Campaign to Dismantle Victoria’s Judicial Independence
When the broadcast light glowed red inside the 3AW Melbourne studio, federal politics and state constitutional law collided on air. Pauline Hanson, the perennial firebrand and founder of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, sat alongside Warren Pickering, her newly installed Victorian state leader, to lay out a provocative proposal for the state: an executive mechanism capable of stripping judicial officers of their robes if their sentencing decisions fail to satisfy public opinion.
The proposal—aimed squarely at the core of the common law tradition—is framed as a populist crusade against “soft” sentences. But behind the fiery rhetoric delivered over talkback radio lies a far more calculating political reality: an insurgent minor party attempting to capitalize on community anxieties over law and order, test the resolve of the Victorian Liberal-National Opposition, and reshape the foundational separation of powers in Victoria.
The Confrontation on the Airwaves
During a broadcast interview with 3AW Mornings host Tom Elliott, Pauline Hanson laid out a policy platform that directly challenges the constitutional tenure of Victoria’s judiciary.
“I’ve advocated for an independent board to be set up,” Hanson told Elliott. “So if the sentences handed down by a judge are not in line with what the public believe in, then they can be called before the board, be made accountable, and you’re going to be put up to losing your job. I think the people have a right to say, hey, listen mate, you’re not giving us the sentence that befits the crime. They’ve got to be made accountable.”
The policy demands the creation of an oversight body empowered to haul judges, magistrates, and tribunal members before disciplinary hearings solely on the basis of their legal rulings and custodial sentencing determinations.
The Statutory Reality: How Judicial Tenure Actually Operates in Victoria
Under current Victorian constitutional law, the statutory machinery Hanson described does not exist, and for deliberate constitutional reasons.
Judicial officeholders in the state are protected by strict statutory safeguards designed to shield the bench from political interference and electoral swings:
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The Statutory Mandate of the Judicial Commission: The Judicial Commission of Victoria was established pursuant to the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) and the Judicial Commission of Victoria Act 2016. Under Section 87AAL of the Constitution Act, the Commission is tasked with four distinct statutory responsibilities: setting standards of professional conduct, investigating complaints regarding judicial officers, assisting investigating panels, and educating the public.
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The Explicit Exclusion of Sentencing Review: By law, the Commission’s complaints framework is prohibited from evaluating judicial determinations. The Commission cannot examine the merits of a decision made by a judicial officer or Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) member, nor can it investigate judicial process or the substantive application of statutory and common law.
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The High Threshold for Judicial Removal: Under Section 87AAB of the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic), the Governor in Council may only remove a judicial officer following a formal address from both houses of the Victorian Parliament praying for removal on the narrow grounds of “proved misbehaviour or incapacity”.
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The Double Safeguard: For any such motion to take legal effect, an independent investigating panel must first formally conclude that facts exist amounting to proved misbehaviour or incapacity. Furthermore, the address must be passed by a “special majority”—defined strictly under Victorian law as a three-fifths (60%) majority of the entire membership of both the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council.
Outside of this rigorous, panel-initiated misconduct threshold, judicial officers serve with security of tenure until the statutory retirement age of 70. Dissatisfaction with a sentence is not legal grounds for dismissal; the established constitutional remedy resides exclusively in appellate review by higher courts.
Transparency on the Bench
Contrary to claims that judicial officers operate behind a veil of bureaucratic secrecy, Victoria’s legal system operates under established public transparency protocols:
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The Supreme Court of Victoria regularly publishes its full judicial roll, cataloging each justice’s division, background, and formal date of appointment.
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Judicial welcome ceremonies and significant hearings are broadcast and preserved on the public record.
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When the Judicial Commission of Victoria concludes formal investigations into misconduct allegations, it routinely publishes outcome statements identifying the officers involved.
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Formal sentencing remarks and written judgments are published openly in the public domain, subject to scrutiny and challenge by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) through the Court of Appeal.
Pickering’s Ambition and Coalition Tensions
Beyond the legal debate, the 3AW broadcast revealed significant developments in minor-party electoral positioning ahead of the Victorian state election administered by the Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC).
When pressed by Elliott on potential balance-of-power scenarios where non-Labor parties command a parliamentary majority, One Nation’s Victorian leader, Warren Pickering, did not hesitate. When asked if he would claim the premiership if One Nation secured more crossbench seats than the Coalition, Pickering answered: “Absolutely.” He affirmed that such an outcome would relegate the Liberal-National Coalition to junior partner status, calling it “the will of the people.”
While declining to finalize a full shadow cabinet, Pickering confirmed the party had settled on senior ministerial advisory picks, with Hanson stating that Colleen Harkin would be slated for the Education portfolio in any negotiated arrangement.
The broadcast also saw Hanson openly confront Victorian Liberal Leader Jess Wilson over preference negotiations. While Wilson has publicly stated her focus remains on securing a standalone majority government, she has kept formal preference discussions open for later in the campaign. Hanson rejected the Coalition’s arm’s-length positioning:
“To have the sheer arrogance saying we’re not going to form a coalition, I don’t want a coalition with them either,” Hanson stated, addressing Wilson directly. “If they have a certain number of elected members and we have a certain number of elected members, will we join our numbers to actually make sure we can form a government to get rid of the Labor government? Get rid of the arrogance, Jess.”
The Wider One Nation Platform
Hanson and Pickering outlined an aggressive statewide campaign operation, claiming over 1,200 expressions of interest for state candidacy, including significant recruitment among former law enforcement personnel, with approximately 122 candidates fielded across lower and upper house seats.
Key elements of their Victorian platform include:
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Repealing Bail and Diversion Schemes: Pickering pledged an immediate end to electronic monitoring bail arrangements—characterizing them as a “tag and release program”—and vowed to establish statutory mechanisms targeting recidivist offenders.
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Dismantling the First Nations Assembly: Pickering promised that “day one, week one” a One Nation government would abolish Victoria’s First Nations Assembly, labeling the treaty process divisive.
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Media Strategy: Hanson addressed One Nation’s decision to exclude mainstream outlets such as the ABC, The Age, and The Guardian from party events, characterizing the media exclusion as a tactical protest against perceived institutional bias.
2. My Professional Perspective
When you spend thirty years investigating parliaments, courtrooms, and political backrooms across Australia and the English-speaking world, you learn to separate the theater of populist grievance from structural statecraft.
Pauline Hanson’s demand to sack judges who deliver unpopular sentences is not a genuine legislative blueprint; it is a tactical wedge designed to harvest law-and-order anxiety and channel it directly into parliamentary leverage.
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ THE ARCHITECTURE OF JUDICIAL TENURE │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL (Current Victoria Framework) │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ • Executive / Legislature appoint judges based on merit. │ │
│ │ • Security of Tenure guaranteed until statutory retirement. │ │
│ │ • Dismissal ONLY for proven misbehaviour or incapacity. │ │
│ │ • Appellate courts correct sentencing errors, NOT politicians. │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ ▲ │
│ VS. │ SEPARATION OF POWERS │
│ ▼ │
│ ONE NATION POPULIST BOARD PROPOSAL │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ • Politically appointed or public "oversight board." │ │
│ │ • Judges summoned to defend specific custodial sentences. │ │
│ │ • Threat of job termination for politically unpopular rulings. │ │
│ │ • Subordinates judicial discretion to prevailing media cycles. │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
The Illusion of the “People’s Accountability Board”
The premise presented to talkback listeners sounds superficially straightforward: If an employee performs poorly, their employer fires them; since the public pays judges, the public should be able to dismiss them for lenient sentences.
This analogy ignores the foundational purpose of an independent judiciary.
The common law doctrine of judicial independence, cemented in the English Act of Settlement 1701 and woven into Australia’s state and federal constitutions, was specifically engineered to prevent judges from ruling according to the whims of the Crown, the mob, or the prevailing tabloid headline. A judge who must calculate whether a legally sound but unpopular sentence will cost them their livelihood ceases to be an impartial arbiter of the law; they become an instrument of political expediency.
If a judge is subject to termination for handing down a sentence that conflicts with public sentiment, the entire criminal justice framework collapses into majoritarian impulse:
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The Erosion of Due Process: Sentencing is not an exercise in vengeance; it is a complex statutory exercise balancing deterrence, community protection, rehabilitation, precedent, and mitigating evidence.
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The Weaponization of the Judiciary: Whichever political faction controls the oversight board effectively controls the outcome of criminal trials. An independent board with power over judicial tenure would quickly become a partisan battleground.
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The Perversion of Bail and Evidence: If judicial officers are intimidated by the threat of removal, they are incentivized to refuse bail, disregard mitigating mental health factors, and impose maximum sentences regardless of statutory thresholds, purely out of professional self-preservation.
What the Headlines Overlook: The Appellate Safeguard
What the populist narrative systematically ignores is that the legal system already possesses a rigorous, institutional mechanism to correct inadequate sentences: the state-funded appeals process.
When a sentencing judge imposes a penalty that is manifestly inadequate or errs in the application of the Sentencing Act 1991, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) routinely lodges a Crown appeal with the Court of Appeal. Senior appellate judges review the trial record, identify errors of law, and increase sentences where warranted.
This process operates within strict legal rules and precedent, preserving the rule of law while ensuring that aberrant sentences are systematically corrected without compromising judicial tenure.
The Real Game: Upper House Quotas and Electoral Mathematics
To understand why this issue is being agitated now, one must look at Victorian electoral mechanics.
Under the proportional representation system used for the Victorian Legislative Council, minor parties do not need to win single-member electorates or secure massive primary votes to gain significant power. With a concentrated primary vote and strategic preference arrangements, minor parties can secure pivotal balance-of-power crossbench seats.
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ VICTORIAN UPPER HOUSE LEGISLATIVE LEVERAGE │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ TOTAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SEATS: 40 (Across 8 Electoral Regions) │
│ MAJORITY THRESHOLD: 21 Seats │
│ │
│ [Major Parties: Labor / Coalition] ◄────────► [Pivotal Crossbench] │
│ │ │
│ • Balance-of-power votes │
│ • Demands for statutory bills │
│ • Pressure on executive │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
By presenting an uncompromising law-and-order platform—sacking judges, scrapping the First Nations Assembly, and repealing bail programs—One Nation is executing a targeted mobilization strategy. The objective is not to draft a viable constitutional amendment to Section 87 of the Constitution Act, which would require insurmountable special majorities and face immediate constitutional challenge.
The objective is to establish an uncompromising baseline that drags the Coalition to the right, fractures the moderate Liberal vote in suburban corridors, and delivers One Nation a handful of critical upper house seats that can hold any future government hostage.
The Questions That Remain Unanswered
Before voters accept talkback promises of judicial dismissals, several fundamental questions demand scrutiny:
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Constitutional Viability: How would any proposed judicial oversight board survive a constitutional challenge under the Kable doctrine, which protects the institutional integrity of state courts exercising federal jurisdiction?
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Board Composition: Who sits on this proposed disciplinary board? If it is staffed by politicians, it destroys the separation of powers. If it is staffed by retired judges, it replicates the appellate system that populists already condemn.
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The Cost of Pre-Trial Incarceration: If bail and diversion schemes are dismantled overnight without significant infrastructure investment, where will the thousands of additional remand prisoners be housed in an already strained correctional system?
The debate over judicial sentencing is as old as the legal system itself. Public frustration over heinous crimes and seemingly lenient penalties is genuine, deeply felt, and entirely understandable. Communities that experience the direct trauma of violent offending deserve a justice system that protects them and enforces meaningful accountability.
However, dismantling judicial tenure in pursuit of rapid retribution is a dangerous trade-off. An independent judiciary is not designed to protect judges from public opinion; it is designed to protect citizens from arbitrary state power and the shifting moods of political expediency.
When political figures suggest that the tenure of the bench should be tied to talkback sentiment, they are not reforming the legal system—they are proposing to dismantle the institutional foundations that guarantee every citizen a fair and impartial trial under the law.
If the sentences of our courts are dictated by the political anxieties of the day rather than the impartial rule of law, who among us can be certain of receiving a fair trial when the political winds inevitably shift?
