Why Patton Wanted to Attack the Soviets in 1945 – The Warning Eisenhower Refused to Hear

May 7th, 1945. General George S. Patton sat across from Supreme Commander Dwight Eisenhower in a commandeered German mansion outside Frankfurt. Germany had just surrendered hours earlier. American soldiers were celebrating in the streets. But Patton wasn’t celebrating. He had come to tell Eisenhower something that would end their friendship.

Something that would get Patton removed from command within months. something that Washington and the media would call insane. “We’re going to have to fight them eventually,” Patton said. “Let’s do it now while our army is intact and we can win.” He wasn’t talking about the Germans. He was talking about the Soviet Union. Eisenhower stared at him.

He had just spent three years building an alliance with the Soviets to defeat Hitler. The American public loved Uncle Joe Stalin. The media portrayed the Red Army as heroic liberators. And here was Patton suggesting they immediately attack their ally. “George, you don’t understand politics.” Eisenhower said, “The war is over. We’re going home.

” Patton looked at his commander and realized something terrible. Eisenhower knew he was right. But Eisenhower wasn’t going to do anything about it. What followed was one of the most consequential silences in American military history. Patton had identified the Soviet threat before anyone in Washington would admit it existed.

He had proposed a military solution while the Red Army was exhausted and American forces were at peak strength. And he was ignored by politicians and generals who cared more about public opinion than strategic reality. Patton’s third army had driven deeper into Germany than any other allied force.

His tanks had reached Czechoslovakia. His advance units were within striking distance of Berlin. And everywhere he went, he saw something that terrified him. The Red Army. Soviet forces were occupying Eastern Europe with brutality that shocked even hardened American combat veterans. Patton’s intelligence officers reported mass rapes.

systematic looting and summary executions of civilians suspected of anti-communist sympathies. Entire populations were being shipped to Soviet labor camps. In April 1945, Patton wrote to his wife Beatatrice. I have no particular desire to understand them except to ascertain how much lead or iron it takes to kill them. The Russians give me the impression of something that is to be feared in future world political reorganization.

He was seeing what Washington diplomats refused to see. The Soviet Union wasn’t a temporary ally against Hitler. It was a totalitarian empire expanding westward. While American politicians naively believed Stalin would honor agreements about free elections and democratic governance. Patton met with liberated American prisoners of war who had been held by the Soviets.

They described treatment worse than what the Germans had given them. Soviet soldiers had stolen their watches, boots, and rations. Officers who protested were beaten or shot. The reports kept coming. Soviet forces were dismantling German factories and shipping entire industrial plants back to Russia. They were installing communist puppet governments in Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

They were arresting and executing anti-communist resistance fighters who had spent years fighting the Nazis. By May 1945, Patton had developed a detailed plan. It wasn’t just angry rhetoric from a frustrated general. It was a legitimate military strategy based on real intelligence about Soviet capabilities and weaknesses.

Patton’s assessment was straightforward. The Red Army had just lost 27 million people defeating Germany. Soviet forces in Eastern Europe were exhausted, overextended, and living off captured supplies. Their supply lines stretched back thousands of miles to Russia. American forces, by contrast, were at peak strength with complete air superiority and intact supply lines.

We could to beat the Russians in 6 weeks, Patton told under secretary of war Robert Patterson in May 1945. The Soviet Union had no strategic bombing capability. The Red Army had minimal anti-aircraft defenses. American air power alone could Soviet logistics. Soviet tank production was impressive.

But the tanks were mechanically unreliable after four years of continuous warfare. American M4 Shermans weren’t as heavily armored, but they were reliable and available in overwhelming numbers. Most importantly, Patton argued the Red Army’s morale was fragile. Soviet soldiers had been told they were fighting to liberate their homeland.

Many had no interest in occupying Eastern Europe permanently. “If American forces pushed east,” Patton believed significant numbers would surrender or desert. “We can arm the Germans,” Patton proposed. “There are hundreds of thousands of Vermach soldiers who would rather fight the Russians than go to P camps.

” This suggestion horrified Washington. The United States had just spent four years defeating Germany, but Patton’s logic was brutal and clear. Germansoldiers hated and feared the Soviets more than they hated Americans. I would rather have a German division on my side than a Soviet one, Patton wrote. This comment would be leaked to the press within weeks.

Eisenhower had military reasons for rejecting Patton’s plan. The American public wanted their sons home. Congress was already demanding rapid demobilization. Logistically, American forces were positioned to occupy Germany, not to push east into Poland. But these weren’t the real reasons Eisenhower rejected Patton’s proposal. The real reasons were political.

President Truman had just taken office and was continuing Roosevelt’s policy of cooperation with Stalin. The Altter Conference had established the framework for post-war Europe. Eisenhower knew that proposing an attack on the Soviet Union would be political suicide. He would be accused of wararm mongering, of risking World War II, of betraying the alliance. The media would destroy him.

[clears throat] Washington would remove him from command. More personally, Eisenhower liked being the hero. He had just won the war in Europe. Newspapers called him the greatest military commander since Grant. He was being discussed as a potential presidential candidate. Why risk that reputation? Eisenhower also believed in the diplomatic solution.

He thought Stalin could be negotiated with that the Soviet Union would moderate once post-war tensions eased. He believed the United Nations could manage disputes between the superpowers. This was the fundamental difference between Eisenhower and Patton. Eisenhower believed in institutions, diplomacy, and political process.

Patton believed in military force and strategic opportunity. Eisenhower thought like a future president. Patton thought like a warrior. George sees the world as a battlefield, Eisenhower told his chief of staff. He doesn’t understand that we have to live with these people. Patton wasn’t alone in his assessment.

Winston Churchill had reached the same conclusion. Churchill had been warning about Soviet intentions since the Bolevik Revolution in 1917. He had only allied with the Soviet Union out of desperate necessity. By April 1945, Churchill was frantically sending messages to Truman and Eisenhower. He wanted Western forces to push as far east as possible before the Soviets consolidated control.

He wanted to take Berlin, Prague, and Vienna before the Red Army arrived. “An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front,” Churchill wrote to Truman on May 12th, 1945. This was the first time he used the phrase that would define the Cold War. “We do not know what is going on behind.” Churchill proposed Operation Unthinkable in May 1945.

It was a detailed military plan for an Allied offensive to push Soviet forces out of Poland and Eastern Europe, assuming the use of rearmed German units fighting alongside American and British forces. The British Chiefs of Staff analyzed Operation Unthinkable and concluded it was militarily feasible if launched immediately.

They estimated Allied forces with German support could defeat Soviet forces in Eastern Europe within months, but they warned it would require total commitment. Churchill sent the plan to Truman. Truman rejected it immediately. He was horrified by the suggestion of attacking the Soviet Union and even more horrified by the proposal to rearm German units.

When Patton learned that Churchill had proposed essentially the same strategy, he felt vindicated. At least one man in power understands what we’re facing, he told his staff. Churchill’s prediction about Soviet intentions proved accurate within months. The press had loved Patton during the war, but in May and June 1945, the coverage changed.

His comments about the Soviets were leaked to journalists. His proposal to rearm German units was characterized as Nazi sympathizing. Columnists questioned his mental stability. Drew Pearson wrote, “General Patton’s recent statements about the Soviet Union raised serious questions about his judgment. At a time when the nation seeks peace, Patton seems intent on starting another war.

” The New York Times editorialized that Patton’s political statements suggest a troubling lack of understanding of diplomatic realities. Time magazine questioned whether his aggressive personality was suited for peace time. None of these outlets reported what Patton was actually observing in Eastern Europe.

None investigated the Soviet atrocities that Patton’s intelligence officers were documenting. The media narrative was set. Patton was a great combat commander who couldn’t adjust to peace time. By August 1945, Eisenhower was receiving pressure from Washington to remove Patton from command. The excuse came from denazification policy. Patton [clears throat] had said at a press conference that requiring all former Nazi party members to be removed from administrative positions was idiotic.

Many had joined for pragmatic reasons, not ideology. >> “This Nazi thing is just like a Democratand Republican election fight,” Patton said. The comment was reported as Patton minimizing Nazi atrocities. The reaction was explosive. On September 28th, 1945, Eisenhower relieved Patton of command of the Third Army.

The official reason was his denazification comments. Everyone understood the real reason. Patton wouldn’t stop warning about the Soviets. After being removed from command, Patton spent his final months documenting Soviet actions, and writing desperate warnings to Washington. His letters from October and November 1945 read like prophecies.

Let’s keep our boots polished, bayonets sharpened, and present a picture of force and strength to the Red Army, Patton wrote. This is the only language they understand and respect. If you fail to do this, then we have had a victory over the Germans and disarmed them. But we have lost the war.

In early December 1945, Patton met with Under Secretary Patterson. He predicted the Soviets would maintain permanent occupation of Eastern Europe. They would spread communism through Western Europe. Military confrontation was inevitable. We’re going to fight them eventually, Patton said. In 5 years or 10 years or 20 years, we’ll wish we had done it in 1945 when we had the chance.

Patterson listened politely, but told Patton that Washington had no interest in confrontation. The American public wanted peace. Patton’s warnings were politically impossible to act on. [clears throat] 3 days later on December 9th, 1945, Patton was critically injured in a car accident near Mannheim. His staff car was struck by a truck.

He was paralyzed from the neck down. He died on December 21st, 1945. 12 days after the accident, the circumstances fueled conspiracy theories. The timing was suspicious. 3 days after submitting his assessment, the truck driver’s explanation seemed implausible, but no credible evidence of assassination was ever produced.

It was likely just a tragic accident that silenced the one general willing to speak truth about the Soviet threat. Everything Patton predicted came true. By 1946, Soviet forces had consolidated control over Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Free elections promised at Yaltta never happened.

In Poland, the Soviets arrested resistance leaders who had fought the Nazis for 6 years. Thousands were executed or sent to labor camps. In Czechoslovakia, a 1948 communist coup overthrew the democratic government. Foreign Minister Jan Maserik died in a suspicious fall ruled suicide. The pattern repeated.

Soviet occupation, communist governments, elimination of opposition. Between 1945 and 1989, communist regimes in Eastern Europe killed approximately 1 million people. Millions more were imprisoned or tortured. The iron curtain Churchill warned about became permanent. The Cold War patent wanted to prevent lasted 45 years, cost trillions of dollars, and killed millions in proxy wars.

By 1949, the Soviets had atomic weapons. By 1950, confronting communist expansion required the Korean War. Patton’s argument was that May 1945 was the moment to act while the Red Army was exhausted and American forces were strong. He was probably right about the window of opportunity. Whether military action would have succeeded is debatable.

Whether it was politically possible is not, but every scenario Patton predicted came true. Soviet occupation was permanent. Communist expansion continued. Military confrontation proved [clears throat] necessary. The only question was timing and scope. For decades after Patton’s death, his warnings were vindicated by events.

Every prediction he made came true. Every policy he opposed proved disastrous. By 1947, even liberals who had supported Roosevelt’s policy had to acknowledge the failure. George Kennan’s long telegram described Soviet expansionism in terms that echoed Patton’s 1945 warnings. The Truman doctrine committed the United States to containing Soviet expansion.

But containment meant accepting Soviet control of Eastern Europe as permanent. It meant fighting limited wars in Korea and Vietnam. It meant 45 years of cold war that Patton believed could have been avoided. Conservative critics cited Patton as a prophet who had seen the truth while politicians chose appeasement.

Douglas MacArthur, who faced similar conflicts with Truman during the Korean War, wrote, “Patton understood that communism had to be confronted militarily. His removal was a tragedy for which we’re still paying the price.” Ronald Reagan cited Patton’s warnings during his 1980 presidential campaign.

Reagan advocated for military strength and confrontation with the evil empire in terms that Patton would have recognized. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, conservatives argued that Reagan’s policy of strength rather than accommodation had vindicated Patton’s 1945 assessment. If Patton had been listened to, Eastern Europe might have been liberated 45 years earlier.

Patton identified theSoviet threat before most American leaders would acknowledge it. He proposed a military solution when one was possible and he was silenced for having the courage to speak uncomfortable truths. The question of whether Patton was right in 1945 isn’t just historical curiosity. It speaks to fundamental questions about American strategy that remain relevant today.

When does the United States confront emerging threats militarily rather than diplomatically? Should generals advocate for what they believe is strategically necessary, even if it’s politically impossible? These questions arose with Patton in [clears throat] 1945 and recur in every generation. After September 11th, debates about confronting terrorism echoed the patent debate.

Should the United States use military force preemptively or wait for threats to materialize? With China’s rise, similar questions emerge. Should America confront Chinese expansion now while power is relatively greater? Patton’s 1945 warnings resonate because they represent the warriors perspective that threats should be destroyed when vulnerable rather than managed until dangerous.

This perspective is perpetually in tension with the diplomat’s view that most conflicts can be resolved through negotiation. Patton’s removal from command could be seen as the system working. A general who wouldn’t accept civilian authority was removed. Or it could be seen as the system failing. A general who correctly identified a strategic threat was silenced for political reasons.

The question matters because the next generation of military leaders will face similar dilemmas. When generals see threats that politicians want to ignore, should they stay silent or speak out? Patton’s answer was clear. Speak the truth regardless of consequences. He paid for that choice with his career and possibly his life.

But he ensured that when history vindicated his warnings, his voice would be remembered. Eisenhower’s refusal to support Patton revealed something fundamental about how he understood leadership. Eisenhower was a coalition builder whose genius was holding together the Allied coalition during World War II. But this made him psychologically incapable of accepting Patton’s argument.

Patton was saying the coalition Eisenhower had built was worthless because one member was an enemy. This contradicted everything Eisenhower had invested his career in. Eisenhower also liked being liked. Patton’s proposal would have made Eisenhower the face of confrontation with the Soviet Union, destroying his reputation as a uniter and peacemaker.

By 1945, both parties were discussing Eisenhower as a potential presidential candidate. Supporting an attack on the Soviets would have been political suicide. The American public in 1945 was exhausted from war. Starting another war would have been massively unpopular. The media would have destroyed Eisenhower for starting World War II.

So Eisenhower chose the politically safe path. [clears throat] He rejected Patton’s warnings, removed him when he wouldn’t stop talking, and pursued cooperation with Stalin. It was understandable from a political perspective. It was disastrous from a strategic perspective. Eisenhower later expressed regret about not taking the Soviet threat more seriously, but he never admitted that Patton had been right to propose immediate military action.

He maintained it was politically impossible and strategically risky. This was Eisenhower’s limitation. He was brilliant at managing coalitions and understanding political reality, but he couldn’t see beyond immediate political constraints to long-term strategic consequences. Patton could. He didn’t care about political reality or his post-war career.

He cared about destroying America’s enemies while the opportunity existed. George S. Patton died on December 21st, 1945 at age 60, paralyzed in a hospital bed. He was buried at the American cemetery in Luxembourg alongside soldiers of the Third Army. He had requested to be buried among his soldiers. In death, Patton became a symbol.

To conservatives, he represented the warrior who saw threats clearly and advocated strength over appeasement. To liberals, he represented the dangerous militarist who preferred war to diplomacy. To the public, he remained the brilliant tank commander who helped win World War II. The question of whether Patton was right about the Soviet Union was answered by subsequent events.

Everything he predicted came true. Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, communist expansion globally, the Cold War that lasted decades, the millions who died under communist tyranny. Whether his proposed solution would have worked is unknowable. Whether it should have been attempted is debatable, but that he correctly identified the threat before most American leaders would acknowledge it is undeniable.

Patton’s tragedy was being right at the wrong moment. He saw in 1945 what others wouldn’t acknowledge until 1947 or later. He proposed action when it mighthave succeeded. He was silenced before he could be vindicated. He died before he could say, “I told you so.” The generation of American leaders who rejected Patton’s warnings went on to fight the Cold War he had wanted to prevent.

They spent 45 years and trillions of dollars containing Soviet power that might have been broken in 1945. Whether they made the right choice is a question each observer must answer. But that they made a choice with enormous consequences is undeniable. Patton’s voice echoes across the decades as a reminder that sometimes the prophet is dismissed, the truth teller is silenced, and the warrior who sees clearly is removed from command by politicians who prefer comfortable lies to uncomfortable truths.

The lesson isn’t necessarily that the United States should have attacked the Soviet Union. The lesson is that strategic threats should be confronted when vulnerable rather than managed until dangerous. That political constraints should inform but not determine military strategy. And that generals who tell the truth should be heard even when their message is unwelcome.

These lessons were learned at enormous cost over the next half century. They may need to be learned again.

Note: Some content was generated using AI tools (ChatGPT) and edited by the author for creativity and suitability for historical illustration purposes.