How Australian SASR Became the Most Feared Unit in Afghanistan Nobody Back Home Knew About

On September 2nd, 2008, in a valley in Uruguan Province, Afghanistan, an Australian SAS trooper named Mark Donaldelsson was running beside a convoy of vehicles that were being shredded by Taliban machine gun fire and rocket propelled grenades. Every seat inside those vehicles was filled with wounded soldiers. There was no room left. So Donelsson and the other unwounded men ran on foot, exposed through a 4 kilometer rolling ambush. Then someone realized they had left a man behind. A coalition interpreter, badly wounded,

lay in the open 80 m from the convoy. Donaldson turned around and sprinted straight through, sustained enemy fire, picked the man up, and carried him back. When reporters asked him about it later, he said it was instinct. He just saw the man there and went and got him. That action earned him the first Victoria Cross awarded to an Australian soldier since the system was established in 1991. But back in Australia, almost nobody knew what had happened because almost nobody back home knew what the Australian SAS was doing in Afghanistan

at all. This is the story of how a small regiment from Perth, Western Australia, became one of the most feared and effective special operations units in the entire Afghanistan war, and why most of the world never heard about it. If you enjoy stories like this about elite military units and the battles that shape their reputations, consider like and subscribe. It really helps the channel and keeps the videos coming. The Australian Special Air Service Regiment is based at Campbell Barracks in Swanborn, a quiet coastal suburb of

Perth. The regiment was formed in 1957, modeled on the British Special Air Service, and it shares the same motto, who dares wins. Getting into the regiment is one of the hardest military selection processes on the planet. Candidates go through a 21-day course that tests physical endurance, mental resilience, and the ability to operate in small teams with no support. The course is designed to break people, sleep deprivation, food deprivation, endless navigation exercises hauling heavy packs through the Western

Australian bush. Out of roughly 130 to 170 candidates who start each year, only about 15 to 30% make it through. And passing selection is just the beginning. The actual training pipeline takes much longer. When Australia committed forces to Afghanistan after the September 11th attacks, the SASR was one of the first units to go. In October 2001, Australian Prime Minister John Howard invoked the Anzus Treaty. Within weeks, SASR operators were on the ground in Afghanistan. All three of the regiment

squadrons deployed in 2001 and 2002. They helped establish Camp Rhino, the first coalition forward operating base southwest of Kanahar. By December 2001, they were part of the force that captured Kanahar International Airport. This was the sharp end of the war. Small teams of Australian operators worked alongside American and British special forces hunting al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership in some of the most hostile terrain on Earth. By the end of 2002, the initial SASR task group was withdrawn. The Australian government

said there weren’t enough tasks to justify the deployment. For the next few years, Australia’s entire contribution to Afghanistan was basically two officers attached to the United Nations. But that didn’t last. In April 2007, a 300 strong special operations task group was redeployed to Afghanistan. This included a special air service regiment squadron, a commando company from the second commando regiment, and combat support elements. They were based at taring cout in Uruan province. And their

job was straightforward. Find and eliminate Taliban leadership through kill or capture missions, disrupt insurgent networks, and support the broader coalition effort. From 2005 onward, each SASR squadron rotated through Afghanistan every 12 months. The second commando regiment rotated every 18 months. Individual operators deployed multiple times. And the tempo was relentless. Troops in contact, meaning active firefights, occurred in roughly two out of every three operations they conducted. Think about that for a

second. Twothirds of the time these operators went out the door, they ended up in a gunfight. The SASR operated with a level of intensity that even American special operations units took notice of. They conducted counter leadership operations, hitting Taliban commanders in their own territory. They ran disruption missions, pushing into valleys and districts that the Taliban considered safe havens. And they did it with a force that at any given time numbered only a few hundred personnel. Meanwhile, most Australians back home

had no real understanding of what was happening. Media access was heavily restricted. The operators themselves were anonymous and the Australian government was not exactly holding press conferences about nightly special forces raids. Remember that ambush in Arusen province where Mark Donelsson earned his Victoria Cross? That was the Battle of Ka Organ. and it deserves a closer look because it shows exactly what kind of fighting the Special Air Service Regiment SASR was doing. The combined Australian, American, and Afghan patrol

had been running ambush operations in the valleys northeast of their forward operating base. A joint US and Australian force had moved into the Anakalai Valley. Two SASR patrols were positioned on foot in the foothills. Five American Humvees crewed by US special forces and Afghan soldiers pushed through the valley floor accompanied by the remaining Australian patrols and an explosive detection dog named Sarby. Then the valley erupted. The Taliban had set up a coordinated ambush with machine guns and RPGs in

entrenched positions. The fire was so intense that one patrol commander later said the bullets were like rain on the surface of water. Nine Australians were wounded. One American Special Forces soldier was killed. The convoy had to fight its way through 4 kilometers of continuous enemy fire to extract. And during all of it, Donaldson repeatedly exposed himself to draw fire away from his wounded mates. The battle lasted over two hours before they finally broke free. The Taliban casualties were estimated at up to 80 killed. The

Australian media did not report the incident until 3 months later. When they did, they identified Donaldson only as Trooper F. But the battle that truly defined the regiment’s reputation in Afghanistan had not happened yet. That came in June 2010 in a district called Shawali Kot. If you’re getting something out of this, hit subscribe. I cover military history and special operations every week. Now let’s get back to Shiaali Kot because this is where things went completely sideways. Shawalikot was a district in northern

Kandahar province known for its aggressive insurgency. Even the best American special forces units including Delta Force were cautious about operating there. Delta had discussed a joint mission with the Australians but was reluctant to fly in during daylight because of the risk of losing a helicopter. The Australians went anyway. On June 10th, 2010, a commando company from the second commando regiment air assaulted into the uh into the village of Chennaru, a Taliban stronghold in the Shinazaf Valley. At 10:00 a.m., every

position around the landing zone opened up with heavy machine gun fire and rocket propelled grenades. The commandos fought all day, pushing the Taliban back through a series of brutal engagements in 50° C heat. One commando sniper, Sergeant Gary Robinson, later said it was kill or be killed. They were trying to kill him, so he had no remorse. The next morning, intelligence indicated that a high value Taliban target had moved into the nearby village of Tzac about 5 km away. The second squadron of

SASR was given the mission. Around 35 operators loaded into force into four American Blackhawk helicopters for what they expected would be a routine capture or kill. Intelligence suggested maybe five Taliban fighters in the village. The Australians did not even bother putting on camouflage face paint. They figured they would be on the ground less than an hour. That turned out to be one of the biggest intelligence failures in the regimen’s history. When the Blackhawks descended toward Taisac, they

flew straight into a wall of gunfire. Machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, rounds punching through cockpit windshields and helicopter fuselages. Three of the four Blackhawks took hits. Instead of five fighters, the Australians found themselves facing over 80 entrenched Taliban. Many of them the same fighters who had battled the commandos the day before and then walked to Taizac overnight. The rational move at that point would have been to pull back and call in an AR strike. A B1 Lancer bomber was orbiting overhead.

They had the coordinates for every building. Legally, they could have leveled the village, but this was the beginning of the American surge strategy under President Obama, destroying an entire Afghan village as one of the first acts of that campaign would have been a propaganda gift to the Taliban. So, the Australians did something that by any conventional military assessment was borderline insane. They conducted a daylight frontal assault on a fortified position held by a force more than twice

their size. Armed with assault rifles and grenades against Doug and machine gun nests, the engagement lasted 13 hours. Over 70 Taliban fighters were killed, including the high-value target who died of his wounds shortly after. 10 of the dead were identified as the as medium value targets. No Australians were killed. Only two were wounded. When coalition intelligence later intercepted Taliban communications, the insurgent high command was furious with their commanders in northern Kandahar for letting so many fighters get caught in

Taizac. Their own assessment was that it would take 10 years to rebuild the insurgent infrastructure in that area. The Australian army considered it the greatest victory of its longest war. The battle of Shiaali Kot earned the SASR and the second commando regiment, the first battle honors awarded to Australian forces since the Vietnam War. 22 soldiers were nominated for bravery decorations. And back in Australia, barely anyone knew what happened. The war ground on. The SASR and commandos continued their rotations. The missions

kept coming. Night raids, valley clearances, ambushes, improvised explosive devices, and green onblue attacks from Afghan allies who turned their weapons on the Australians, training them. Then came June 22nd, 2013, Kachak village in Arusen province. Corporal Cameron Barrett was a commando team commander on his fourth tour of Afghanistan. His unit conducted a helicopter assault into an insurgent network deep in enemy held territory. Almost immediately after insertion, Baird’s team came under fire from

multiple positions. Baird led his team forward, personally, killing six enemy fighters and clearing the way for the assault to continue. Then, a nearby team’s commander was shot and seriously wounded. Without hesitation, Bair led his soldiers to support them. They ran straight into prepared positions with rifle and machine gun fire pouring down on them. Bair charged an enemy held doorway. Twice, he was driven back. On the third charge, he pushed through and killed an enemy fighter inside, giving

his platoon the advantage they needed. It cost him his life. He was 32 years old. Cameron Bar became the 100th Australian to receive the Victoria Cross in Australia’s last battlefield casualty in Afghanistan. By the time Australia ended combat operations in December 2013, the numbers told a story that most Australians had never fully grasped. 41 soldiers were killed, 261 were wounded. Special forces personnel made up just 16% of the army’s contribution to Afghanistan, but they suffered 50% of all casualties,

including half of all operational deaths. The regiment and the commandos earned more than 150 battlefield awards, including three Victoria Crosses. Around 40,000 Australian Defense Force personnel served in Afghanistan operations between 2001 and 2021. They fought in a war that most people back home could not define in a country most Australians would never visit under rules of engagement that changed with every rotation and with a level of commitment that the public rarely saw. The first public memorial ceremony for

veterans of Australia’s modern Middle East Wars was not held until July 2024, more than a decade after the last combat troops came home. The Australian Special Air Service did not become feared in Afghanistan because they had better equipment than everyone else or because they had more people. They became feared because a small group of operators drawn from a country of 25 million people on the other side of the planet kept showing up in the most dangerous places in Afghanistan rotation after rotation

year after year. And they kept winning fights they had no business winning. If you want to see how another coalition special forces unit carved out its own reputation in Afghanistan, that video is on screen now.

Note: Some content was generated using AI tools (ChatGPT) and edited by the author for creativity and suitability for historical illustration purposes.