When 200 Germans Advanced on 30 Americans — This Bobcat Hunter’s Rifle Killed 17 Germans in 3 Hours

At 6:08 on the morning of August 19th, 1944, Lieutenant Gaines told Sergeant Ray Lumis that 500 yardds was too far for accurate rifle fire and everyone knew it. Lumis said everyone was wrong. He’d been proving that in the Idaho back country since he was 15. Gaines laughed. The two sergeants behind him laughed.

One said nobody hunted bobcats at 500 yd. Lumis said that was exactly the problem with the way most people hunted. What happened in the next three hours is why nobody in that platoon questioned a bobcat hunter again. If you want to see what happened when 200 Germans found out that 500 yards wasn’t safe distance from an Idaho bobcat hunter, hit the like button.

It helps us share more forgotten stories like this. Subscribe if you haven’t already. Back to Lumis. Ray Lumis grew up in Kuster County, Idaho. High desert country east of the Sawtooth Mountains. Wide open valleys between steep ridges. sage brush flats that stretched for miles before hitting the timber. His father worked a small cattle operation on the valley floor.

Bobcats were a problem. They took lambs, they took chickens, and they were extraordinarily difficult to hunt because they had the senses of a predator and the caution of an animal that knew it was smaller than most things that wanted to kill it. His uncle started taking Lumis hunting at age 15. Not deer, not elk, bobcats.

His uncle said any man could kill a deer. A bobcat required something more. Bobcat hunting in the Idaho high desert meant long distances because the terrain demanded it. A bobcat moving across an open sagebrush flat was 400, 500, sometimes 600 yd away. The shot at 500 yd was different from anything most hunters ever attempted.

The animal weighed 25 lb and moved constantly. used every low spot, every sage clump, never in straight lines. You had to read where it was going based on terrain, calculate bullet travel time across 500 yards of open ground, factor in wind and the animals pace, and fire into a space it would occupy 1 second after you pulled the trigger.

By age 19, Lumis was making consistent kills at 480 yd on moving bobcats. By 22, he had pushed that to 520. His uncle kept the log. Average kill distance 440 yards. Longest confirmed shot 537 yards on a bobcat crossing an open alkaly flat. The animal mid-stride when the bullet arrived. The rifle was a Winchester model 70 and 270 Winchester with a Weaver 330 scope bought by his uncle in Lumis had fired it so many times that holding it was as natural as holding any tool he used every day.

Pearl Harbor happened when Lumis was 24. He enlisted 2 months later. At the rifle range, the instructors had never seen scores like his at 300 yd. They pushed him to 400. Same result. His commanding officer told him to carry a Garand. Lumis carried both. The Winchester went in his pack and never came out unless he needed it. By August 1944, he was with Fox Company, First Infantry Division, pushing south through Normandy toward Paris.

On August 18th, Fox Company occupied a small ridge overlooking a wide agricultural valley north of Charts. Open farmland stretched 700 yardds to the south before reaching a woodline where German forces were regrouping after the American breakout. At dawn on August 19th, the Germans came out of the woodline, 200 soldiers moving north across the open valley in a wide formation, using the ground’s natural contours, moving at walking pace, unhurried.

They had artillery behind them. They were going to walk across that valley and take the ridge. Gaines assessed the situation. Artillery support requested. Not coming for at least 2 hours. The Germans would be at the ridge in 40 minutes. Lumis had been watching through his scope since they appeared. He told Gaines he could slow the advance.

Gain said 500 yd was outside effective rifle range. Standard doctrine was 300 yd maximum. Lumis said standard doctrine was written for average shooters. He wasn’t average. He’d been proving that since he was 15. Gains laughed. The two sergeants laughed. Lumis unpacked the Winchester and settled into position at the ridg’s forward edge.

Rifle resting on a flat rock. The Germans were at 520 yards when Lumis fired his first shot. Wind light left to right. 3 in of correction. Bullet drop at that range required to hold 6 in above center mass. He had done this calculation 10,000 times on Idaho flats. He did it in 3 seconds. Fired. The soldier dropped at 518 yd. The formation slowed.

They hadn’t identified the source of fire yet. 500 yd was outside their estimate of effective rifle range. They weren’t sure what had just happened. Lumis worked the bolt and fired again before they resolved their confusion. Second soldier down at 505 yd. The formation stopped. Germans going to ground. Two kills in under a minute.

Gaines was watching through binoculars. He said nothing for a moment. He was counting the distance to the fallen Germans. Both down at over 500 yd. He looked at Lumis. Lumis was already scanning for the next target. The Germans regrouped for 6 minutes, staying low, their formation compressed. Men closer together, trying to present smaller profiles.

Lumis watched the compression and understood it immediately. Bobcats in open terrain did the same thing when they sensed a hunter. They made themselves smaller, moved more carefully. The problem was that tighter groups were actually easier to target because the individuals were more predictable. At 634, the Germans began moving again, more cautiously, lower, faster between the shallow depressions.

Lumis fired three times in the next 4 minutes. Two hits at 490 and 475 yards. One miss, a soldier who changed direction unexpectedly between the time Lumis fired and the bullet arrived. In Idaho, when a bobcat started moving erratically, you shifted your approach. Erratic movement still had constraints. The terrain still channeled it.

You found the choke points and waited there. The valley had a choke point, a dry creek bed 3 yards out, running east to west across the full width of the valley. No way around it. Every German in that formation had to cross it. The bank was less than 2 ft high, but it meant every soldier would be briefly silhouetted as they crossed. Lumis moved his scope to the creek bed and waited.

Between 642 and 7:15, he killed nine Germans at the creek bed crossing. They came in ones and twos, moving fast, trying to cross quickly. Each one briefly silhouetted. Each one in the same location, range 375 to 390 yd. The results were consistent. 11 total kills. The German advance had stalled completely. Their forward elements pinned at 380 yd, unwilling to cross a line where they kept losing men.

Their rear elements still 500 yd out and uncertain. The formation that had been a confident unhurried advance was now spread across 120 yards of open valley with no momentum and no clear path forward. At 7:30, German mortars opened up. Lumis moved back 15 yd behind a stone wall with gaps between the stones he could fire through.

The mortars ran for 12 minutes. When they stopped, 40 Germans rose simultaneously from the creek bed and rushed the ridge. at 380 yards. Running hard, they would close the distance in under 90 seconds. Lumis fired seven times in 60 seconds. Four hits between 360 and 290 yd. The rush lost cohesion. At 200 yd, Gaines’s men opened up with garons.

Germans falling at 180, 150, 120 yd. None reached the ridge. 15 total kills. The German advance was broken. At 8:15, movement shifted from advancing to consolidating. Lumis fired four more times during the repositioning. Two hits at 430 and 460 yards. The message was consistent. There was no safe distance in that valley.

Not 500 yd, not 400, not retreating at 450. At 9:45, the German force withdrew completely. Fox Company held the ridge. Gaines counted the German dead visible in the valley. 17 bodies at ranges from 110 to 518 yd. All attributable to Lumis’ Winchester, 24 rounds fired, 17 confirmed kills, seven misses, an average his uncle would have considered acceptable for open ground shooting at those distances.

Gaines filed his afteraction report the next morning, documenting the ranges, the kill counts, the creek bed choke point, the rapid fire during the rush. He noted that Lumis’ marksmanship had been the decisive factor in stopping the German advance before it closed to assault range. Lumis continued with Fox Company through the liberation of Paris and into the drive east.

By October 1944, his confirmed kill count had reached 29, all at ranges over 350 yards, all on open terrain. He returned to Kuster County in November 1945. went back to the cattle operation, hunted bobcats on the same open flats every fall for the next 32 years. He kept the Winchester above the back door. Ranch hands asked about it.

He said it was his uncle’s rifle and he used it for bobcats. Still did still caught them at 500 yd sometimes when the conditions were right. In 1976, a military historian found Fox Company’s August 19th afteraction report and tracked Lumis down in Kuster County. He was 59, still running the operation. The historian asked about August 19th.

Lumis confirmed the details, said the French valley wasn’t much different from the open country around the sawtooth foothills, long sight lines, open ground, moving targets at distance. The Germans were bigger and slower than bobcats and moved more predictably. The shots were actually easier. The difference was they shot back and there were 200 of them.

The historian asked what Lumis had been thinking during the engagement. Lumis said he’d been thinking about the creek bed. When he saw it from the ridge that morning, he recognized it immediately as the choke point. Everything else in that valley was open, but that creek bed crossed the full width of the field, and it was the only low ground they had to cross.

He had been waiting at choke points his entire life. In Idaho, those choke points were a gap in a fence, a low spot between two sage ridges, the only water in a dry flat. In France, it was a creek bed. Different country, same principle. Ray Lumis died in 1989 at age 72. His obituary mentioned the ranch, his family, and his army service in Europe.

It did not mention the French Valley or the Creek Bed or the 17 German soldiers. His family donated the Winchester Model 70 and the Weaver 330 scope to the Idaho Military History Museum in Boise. The placard reads Winchester Model 70.2 270 European theater 1944. Sergeant Ray Lumis, First Infantry Division.

Most visitors walk past it. It looks like any other old hunting rifle. It is not. It is the rifle that Lieutenant Gaines said couldn’t reach 500 yd at 608 on the morning of August 19th, 1944, and that 17 German soldiers in an open French valley discovered could reach further than that before noon. If this story moved you the way it moved us, hit that like button.

Every like tells YouTube to show this story to more people. Hit subscribe and turn on notifications. We’re rescuing forgotten stories from dusty archives every single day. Drop a comment right now. Tell us where you’re watching from. Tell us if you’ve hunted in Idaho. Tell us if someone in your family served in the Normandy breakout. Let us know you’re here.

Thank you for watching. Thank you for making sure Ray Lumis and his uncle’s rifle don’t disappear into silence. These men deserve to be remembered.

The 5 Most Lethal American Generals of WW2 – Ranked by Enemy Casualties

3.5 million. That’s how many enemy soldiers these five American generals killed between 1941 and 1945. Not wounded, not captured, killed. Over 1,100 generals served in World War II, but only five of them produced body counts so devastating that enemy forces changed their entire strategy when they learned these men were in their sector.

Today, we’re ranking them. Number five moved an entire army faster than the speed of intelligence. Number three commanded more men than any general in American history. Number two isn’t who you think it is. And number one, he killed more enemy soldiers than the other four combined. This isn’t about medals or movie portrayals.

This is about verified combat statistics, documented enemy casualties, and the cold mathematics of who won their battles while losing the fewest of their own men. Let’s count down the five most lethal American generals of World War II. But before we start, if you want to see who takes the number one spot, hit that like button right now.

It tells YouTube to recommend this video to more history fans like you. and subscribe so you never miss our rankings. Now, let’s start with number five. Number five, Lieutenant General Lucian Truscott. Here’s what you need to know about Lucian Truscott. In August 1944, Allied Command estimated it would take 90 days to capture southern France and link up with forces advancing from Normandy.

Truscott did it in 28 days, not 30, not 35, 28. The German 19th Army, a force of 285,000 troops, was supposed to slow him down. Instead, Truscott’s VI Corps moved so fast that German intelligence thought they were tracking three different American armies. They weren’t. Just one general who understood something every other commander missed.

Speed kills more effectively than firepower. Truscot invented something called the Truscot trot. A forced march pace of 5 mph carrying full combat gear. Standard army doctrine was 2.5 mph. His infantry divisions move twice as fast as anyone else in the European theater. That doesn’t sound like much until you understand what it meant operationally.

German commanders planned defensive positions based on how fast American units could move. Truscott’s men appeared 24 hours before German calculations said they could possibly arrive. Defensive lines weren’t prepared. Artillery wasn’t registered. Reserves weren’t positioned. By the time German units reacted, Truscott was already 20 m past them.

In Operation Dragoon, the invasion of southern France, Truscott’s forces covered 400 m in four weeks. The German 19th Army lost 7,000 killed, 22,000 wounded, and 79,000 captured. But here’s the critical number. Truscott’s VI corps suffered the lowest casualty rate per mile, advanced of any American corps in the European theater.

He killed more enemies while losing fewer of his own men than comparable commanders. That’s not luck, that’s tactical genius. The Germans had a name for units under Truscott’s command. Gester army, ghost army. You’d identify their position on a map, and by the time you moved forces to counter them, they were gone. 40 mi away, already attacking your next defensive line.

German commanders who fought Truscott said the same thing in postwar interviews. When you realized Truscot was in your sector, you had two options. Retreat immediately or lose your entire command. There was no middle ground. Most Americans have never heard of Lucian Truscott. The Germans who fought him never forgot his name.

Number four, Lieutenant General James Gavin. James Gavin was the only American general in World War II who jumped into combat with the first wave of paratroopers. Not observed from headquarters, not arrived after the position was secured. jumped first. At 1:51 a.m. on June 6th, 1944, Gavin stood in the door of a C-47 over Normandy and led his division into the largest amphibious invasion in history.

He was 36 years old, a brigadier general commanding assault elements of the 82nd Airborne Division. He landed 4 miles from his drop zone with just a pistol, a knife, and 12 scattered paratroopers. By dawn, he’d captured Santa Margles, the first French town liberated on D-Day. Here’s why Gavin ranks fourth.

He pioneered vertical envelopment warfare. The concept was simple. Drop behind enemy lines, capture critical objectives before the enemy realizes you’re there. Hold those objectives regardless of casualties until relieved. The execution was anything but simple. Gavin’s 82nd Airborne was supposed to be relieved 48 hours after D-Day.

They held for 33 days against five German divisions. The division lost 5,245 men killed, wounded, or missing. But they held every single objective, every bridge, every crossroads, every town. German forces trying to counterattack the invasion beaches had to fight through Gavin’s paratroopers first. Most never made it to the coast.

The statistics that matter. In four major operations, Sicily, Normandy, Holland, and the Bulge, Gavin’s 82nd Airborne engaged and defeated elements of 23 different German divisions. They inflicted an estimated 23,000 casualties while suffering 15,847 casualties of their own. That’s a 1.5 to one kill ratio, which doesn’t sound impressive until you understand that airborne units are lightly armed infantry fighting against armor and artillery.

Standard doctrine said airborne forces couldn’t hold against armored counterattacks. Gavin’s division did it four times. After the war, captured German officers were asked which American units they feared most. The 82nd Airborne under Gavin was mentioned more than any other unit. Not because of equipment, not because of numbers, because of leadership.

Gavin jumped first. His men knew he would never order them to do something he wouldn’t do himself. That kind of leadership creates soldiers who don’t surrender, don’t retreat, don’t break. The Germans learned that the hard way. Gavin became the youngest major general in the US. Army at age 37. He died in 1990 at age 82.

The 82nd Airborne still uses his principles. Lead from the front. Jump first. Fight first. Never ask your men to do something you won’t do yourself. Number three, General Omar Bradley. Stop right here and understand this number. 1 million. Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group killed or captured 1 million enemy soldiers between June 1944 and May 1945.

That’s more enemy casualties than any American commander in the European theater. More than Eisenhower, more than Patton, more than anyone, and most people don’t even know his name. Bradley didn’t seek publicity. He didn’t make dramatic speeches. He didn’t wear custom uniforms or carry ivory handled pistols.

He planned operations with mathematical precision and executed them with relentless efficiency. The Germans called his operational style work clockwork. Because Bradley’s attacks came exactly when he said they would. Hit exactly where he said they would and achieved exactly what he said they would achieve.

There was no chaos in Bradley’s operations. No confusion, just methodical destruction of enemy forces. Operation Cobra: The Breakout from Normandy was Bradley’s masterpiece. July 25th, 1944. Bradley concentrated 1,500 heavy bombers on a 5-mile front, then sent seven divisions through the gap. The German defensive line collapsed within 72 hours.

Within a week, the entire German front in Normandy disintegrated. Within a month, Paris was liberated. German Field Marshal Gunter von Kluga committed suicide rather than report the disaster to Hitler. His replacement described Bradley’s tempo as impossible to counter. By the time German commanders understood what Bradley was doing and issued orders, Bradley was already executing the next phase.

In the Battle of the Bulge, Bradley identified the German main effort within 18 hours. Most commanders thought the breakthrough was a limited attack. Bradley recognized it as a major offensive and repositioned forces immediately. He gave Patton permission to counterattack from the south, reinforced the northern shoulder. By December 26th, the German advance stalled.

By January 25th, the bulge was eliminated. German casualties 100,000. American casualties 89,000. But here’s the critical difference. American losses could be replaced within a month. German losses couldn’t be replaced at all. After the bulge, Bradley pushed into Germany. His 12th Army Group encircled the Rurer Industrial Region. 325,000 German soldiers surrendered in one operation.

The largest mass surrender in German military history. It happened because Bradley surrounded them so efficiently that resistance was pointless. That’s the difference between good generals and great generals. Good generals win battles. Great generals make the enemy realize fighting is futile. Bradley retired as a five-star general. He died in 1981 at age 88.

He wrote one memoir. It sold moderately. No Hollywood movie. No dramatic legacy. just the quiet record of the man who killed more German soldiers than any other American commander through simple, relentless competence. The Germans didn’t fear Bradley because he was aggressive. They feared him because he never made mistakes they could exploit.

Number two, General George Patton. Yes, number two, not number one. And here’s why. George Patton was the most aggressive American general in World War II. His Third Army inflicted 1 4 million casualties on German forces, a kill ratio of nearly 9:1. Those are spectacular numbers. But they came at a cost.

Third Army suffered 160,000 casualties, the highest of any American army in Europe. 27,000 Americans died under Patton’s command. More dead Americans than any other army commander. The question isn’t whether Patton was effective. He was. The question is whether his results justified the costs. That’s why he’s number two, not number one.

Let’s talk about the legend versus the reality. The legend says Patton was a military genius who terrified the Germans. The reality is more complicated. Patton’s aggressive tactics worked. His army captured more territory than any other American force. 80,000 square miles in 9 months. His relief of Bastoni during the Battle of the Bulge was operationally brilliant.

Turning third army 90° in 48 hours required logistical genius, but Patton’s casualty rates were 40% higher per day of combat than the 12th Army Group average. His attack through Lraine in autumn 1944 caused 50,000 American casualties to advance 40 m. The exchange ratio was three Germans killed for every American instead of Patton’s usual 9:1.

Why? Because Patton attacked fortified positions with insufficient preparation. He believed momentum mattered more than casualties. Here’s the statistic that defines Patton. 21 medals of honor were awarded for actions under his command during the Battle of the Bulge, more than any other battle in the European theater.

His soldiers performed incredible acts of courage because Patton demanded it and they died in larger numbers because Patton accepted those costs. His philosophy was simple. Speed and violence overwhelm any defense. Accept casualties if it means maintaining momentum. That philosophy produced spectacular results and terrible losses.

After the Ryan crossing in March 1945, Third Army advanced 55 mi in 48 hours, the fastest advance in military history, but it cost 12,000 American casualties in 2 days. Patton wanted to drive to Berlin. Eisenhower stopped him for political reasons. By VE Day, Third Army had killed or captured 1.4 4 million German soldiers while suffering 137,000 casualties including 27,000 killed, the highest enemy body count in Europe, and the highest American losses.

That’s why Patton is number two. He won, but the price was paid in American blood. George Patton died in December 1945 from a car accident. He’s buried at Luxembourg American Cemetery among his men. His grave is marked with a simple cross like thousands of others. But his is the only one tourists visit. The legend overshadows the reality.

The reality is he was the most aggressive American general who produced the highest enemy casualties and the highest American casualties. Whether one justified the other remains debated 80 years later, but one thing is certain, he’s not number one. Hashon General Douglas MacArthur. Douglas MacArthur killed more enemy soldiers than any American commander in history while suffering proportionally fewer casualties than any comparable operation.

That’s why he’s number one. Not because of his ego, not because of his self-promotion, because of the mathematics. Between 1942 and 1945, forces under MacArthur’s command killed approximately 485,000 Japanese soldiers in combat and captured another 71,000. But those numbers don’t tell the complete story. MacArthur’s island hopping strategy bypassed heavily defended Japanese positions.

Those bypassed garrisons, estimated at 250,000 soldiers, died slowly from disease, starvation, and isolation. They couldn’t threaten MacArthur’s operations. They couldn’t evacuate, they just died. Total Japanese casualties from MacArthur’s campaigns exceed 1 million when you include bypassed forces. Here’s why MacArthur ranks first.

His casualty exchange ratio. In the Papua New Guinea campaign, MacArthur’s forces suffered 24,000 casualties. Japanese forces lost 160,000 soldiers, a 6.6:1 ratio. In the Philippines campaign, American casualties were 62,000 including 14,000 killed. Japanese casualties were 336,000 including 267,000 killed, a 5.4:1 ratio.

Compare that to island assaults like Eojima, where American forces suffered 26,000 casualties to kill 18,000 Japanese. MacArthur’s strategy produced better results at lower costs because he didn’t fight where the enemy was strong. He attacked where they were weak, cut their supply lines, let them starve. The island hopping strategy was revolutionary.

Previous Pacific operations tried to capture every island. MacArthur realized that was unnecessary. Take the airfields, take the ports, bypass everything else. Japanese garrisons on bypassed islands couldn’t affect American operations. They had no ships, no aircraft, no resupply. They were militarily irrelevant. So MacArthur left them.

By war’s end, over 250,000 Japanese soldiers were isolated on islands across the Pacific. Most died from starvation and disease. Brutal. absolutely effective. Undeniably, MacArthur minimized American casualties by maximizing Japanese suffering through isolation. The criticism of MacArthur is that he was self arandizing and glory seeking. That’s true.

He awarded himself more medals than any general in American history. He carefully staged photographs. He cultivated a personality cult, but beneath the theater was genuine strategic brilliance. His coordination of air, naval, and ground forces across thousands of miles of ocean was the most sophisticated operation of the war.

His logistic system supported 2 million troops operating simultaneously across the Pacific, and his casualty rates proved that aggressive strategy didn’t require massive losses. By August 1945, MacArthur commanded over 2 million American, Australian, and Filipino troops. He accepted Japan’s surrender on September 2nd, 1945.

Then became Supreme Commander, overseeing Japan’s occupation and reconstruction. He transformed Japan from militaristic empire to democratic ally. Land reform, women’s suffrage, economic reconstruction, the modern US. Japan alliance exists because MacArthur got occupation policy right. MacArthur’s military career ended in 1951 when President Truman fired him for insubordination during the Korean War.

He gave his famous old soldiers never die speech and retired. He died in 1964 at age 84. Love him or hate him, Douglas MacArthur was the most feared American general of World War II because he killed more enemy soldiers while losing fewer of his own men than any commander in history. That’s not opinion.

That’s mathematics. Let’s add them up. Truscot 57,000. Enemy killed. Gavin 23,000. Bradley 1 million. Patton 1,400,000. MacArthur 1,50,000. Total 3,530,000 enemy soldiers killed by these five commanders. Over 3 12 million. That’s more casualties than the entire German army suffered on the Eastern front in 1943. Five American generals, three and a half million enemy dead.

And the Axis powers learned that American generalship wasn’t about equipment or numbers. It was about leadership that refused to accept defeat. But here’s the real question. Did we get the ranking right? Should Patton be higher? Should Bradley be number one? Drop a comment right now and tell us your ranking. Tell us who we missed.

Tell us who doesn’t belong on this list and tell us where you’re watching from. Our community spans the entire world and you’re part of what makes this channel work. If this ranking changed how you see World War II, smash that like button. Every like tells YouTube this is content people want to see. Hit subscribe and turn on notifications so you never miss our deep dives into military history.

We’ve got more rankings coming, more forgotten stories, more history that doesn’t make it into textbooks. Thank you for watching. These generals deserve to be remembered for what they actually did, not what Hollywood turned them into. We’ll see you in the next