Japanese Thought Their Type 97 Tanks Were Invincible — Until 37mm Guns Punched Through at 10 Yards

At 06:15 on the morning of January 9th, 1942, Staff Sergeant Benjamin Morett sat in the commander’s position of his M3 Stewart light tank, watching eight Japanese type 97 Chiha medium tanks advance through the jungle 400 yards ahead of his position on the Baton Peninsula in the Philippines. 26 years old with three weeks of combat experience and zero tank versus tank engagements behind him.

Morett commanded a platoon of three M3 Stewarts from the 192nd Tank Battalion. It’s the first American armor unit to face Japanese tanks in combat. And the official doctrine from higher command came through explicit and unambiguous. Preserve the tanks. Avoid engagement with superior enemy forces. Withdraw when outnumbered.

outnumbered nearly 3 to one Sat Morett’s current situation facing eight Japanese tanks with his three American tanks in and every bit of intelligence and every briefing and every rumor that had circulated through the American forces for the past 3 weeks said the same thing. Japanese tanks were battle tested killers that had crushed Chinese armies for four years, had steamrolled through Malaya in three weeks, had destroyed British armor in Singapore, and were considered by most American soldiers to be superior to anything the United States had fielded

in the Pacific. Wayne, nobody actually knew if that assessment held true because no American tank crew had ever stood and fought. and the one previous encounter between American and Japanese armor had ended with the Americans retreating without firing a shot. Morett’s gunner sat below him in the turret.

Corporal James Mitchell from Sacramento, California, 22 years old, trained on the M3 Stewart’s 37mm M6 gun for 6 months at Fort Knox, but never fired at an actual enemy target. Instant Mitchell’s hands rested on the traversing controls, waiting for orders that Doctrine said would be withdraw to secondary positions. Radio and Morett’s headset crackled with transmissions from the other tank commanders in his platoon.

Both asking the same question that had no good answer. Do we engage or do we pull back? Eight enemy tanks versus three friendly tanks violated every tactical principle the army had taught them about armored warfare. What those tactical principles didn’t account for sat in three weeks of continuous retreat. Three weeks of watching Japanese forces push American and Filipino troops steadily backward toward the southern tip of Baton.

Three weeks of infantry pleading for tank support that never came because the tanks were being preserved for some future battle that never seemed to arrive. Morett made his decision in the space of maybe 5 seconds. all keying his radio and transmitting to his platoon and to anyone else who might be listening on the battalion net.

And his exact words would be recorded in the 192nd Tank Battalion’s afteraction report filed later that day and preserved in the National Archives for the next 80 years. We’re going to find out what these guns can do. Fear that had paralyzed American tank operations in the Philippines came from a combination of ignorance, reputation, and an one disastrous first encounter that had established a pattern nobody had yet broken.

December 22nd, 1941, the town of Demortis on the Lingayan Gulf brought a single M3 Stewart from Company B encountering three Japanese Type 97 Chiha tanks advancing down the coastal road. And the American tank commander, whose name never appeared in official reports, observed the Japanese tanks from a position of advantage with clear fields of fire and the element of surprise.

That standard doctrine said, “Engage enemy armor when conditions favor success.” And every condition favored the Americans at that moment, except for one critical factor. The American crew had no idea if their 37 mm gun could penetrate Japanese tank armor because nobody had ever tried. Many of the intelligence briefings they had received before deploying to the Philippines had characterized Japanese tanks as heavily armored and battle tested and superior to most Allied designs.

American tank commander watched the three Japanese tanks approach to within 300 yd, well within effective range for the 37mm gun, and then made the decision to withdraw without engaging. and the Stewart reversed out of its position and retreated to American lines, misreporting contact with superior Japanese armor.

Three Japanese tank commanders observed the American withdrawal and reported to their superiors that American tanks were unwilling to fight, confirming what Japanese intelligence had already suspected. American armor in the Philippines presented negligible threat that could be ignored or brushed aside during offensive operations.

Thus, that single encounter on December 22nd established the pattern that had governed tank operations for the next 2 and 1/2 weeks. And the pattern ran simple and consistent. Japanese tanks advanced. American tanks withdrew. Infantry fought without armored support. The retreat continued. Nobody questioned whether the intelligence assessments held accuracy because the reputation of Japanese armor preceded actual combat experience.

And that reputation had been earned through four years of warfare in China and recent victories throughout Southeast Asia. Type 97 Chiha medium tank had entered service with the Imperial Japanese Army in 1937. Designed specifically for the war in China where Japanese forces faced an enemy that possessed almost no armor and limited anti-tank capabilities.

And against Chinese infantry armed with rifles and machine guns, the Chiha performed exactly as designed. Imp providing mobile fire support and breaking up defensive positions that would have stalled conventional infantry attacks. Chiha’s armor reflected its intended mission with a maximum thickness of 25 mm on the front hull and turret, 20 mm on the sides and as little as 8 mm on the top and bottom.

And Japanese designers had prioritized mobility over protection at least calculating correctly that 25 mm would stop rifle bullets and machine gun fire. and most of what the Chinese army could throw at it. What Japanese designers had not anticipated sat in the possibility of facing American tanks equipped with high velocity anti-tank guns.

Because Japan’s war planning assumed American forces would be defeated quickly in the Philippines and pushed out of the Western Pacific before they could establish any meaningful armored presence. Oshim 3 Stewart light tank that American forces deployed to the Philippines carried a 37 millimeter M6 gun that could penetrate 61 mm of armor at 100 yard, 53 mm at 500 yd and 46 mm at 1,000 yd, which meant the Chihaw’s maximum armor thickness of 25 mm could be penetrated by the Stewart’s gun at ranges exceeding 2,000 yd, more than a

mile away. At close range, the 37 millimeter could punch through both sides of a Chihaw and keep going. But here’s the thing. Nobody in the American chain of command knew these numbers because the two tank types had never met in combat. And the technical specifications of Japanese armor remained classified and unknown to American intelligence officers who were making educated guesses based on incomplete information.

In result was a tactical situation where American tank crews with superior equipment were retreating from Japanese tank crews and inferior equipment because nobody had tested the actual capabilities of either side’s armor and weapons. Morett understood this gap between perception and reality even if he couldn’t articulate the technical details.

And he understood something else that three weeks of retreat had taught him. preservation doctrine was getting infantry killed. M and tanks that never fought were tanks that serve no purpose and eventually someone would have to stand and engage or the entire American defensive line would collapse without ever knowing if they could have held.

January 9th, 1942 at 0615 would be the test. Eight Japanese Chiha tanks advancing through jungle terrain toward American positions. 3M M3 Stewarts positioned in hold down defensive positions with clear fields of fire and the element of surprise. Morett’s decision to engage violated doctrine and common sense and everything the 192nd Tank Battalion had practiced for the previous 3 weeks.

And if he had read the capabilities mismatch wrong, his crew and the crews of the other two Stuarts under his command would likely die in the next few minutes. Mitchell centered the lead Japanese tank in his gun site, a type 97 Chiha, advancing at approximately 15 mph in column formation with the other seven tanks following behind.

The men range sat at 600 yd and decreasing steadily as the Japanese column moved closer to the American positions. Morett’s voice came through the intercom system, connecting all four crew members, giving the fire command that would test everything. Gunner, Sabot, tank. Mitchell acknowledged, confirming he had a 37mm armor-piercing round loaded in the lead Japanese tank in his sights, and the Stewart’s turret was already trained on target.

The gun elevated for the 600yd shot. Bard the loader standing by with additional rounds. Morett took one final look at the advancing Japanese column through his commander’s vision blocks. Eight tanks spread across maybe 200 yards of front, none of them showing any indication they knew American armor was waiting an ambush. Fire.

Recoil from the 37 mm gun came with a sharp crack that echoed through the jungle, the muzzle blast kicking up dust and debris around the steward’s position. E and the armor-piercing round crossed 600 yardds in just over a second. Morett watched through his vision blocks as the round struck the lead Chiha’s front armor. round didn’t ricochet and didn’t deflect and didn’t fail to penetrate.

And the 37mm armor-piercing shell punched straight through the Chiha’s 25 mm front hull armor, continued through the fighting compartment where it killed or wounded the crew, punched through the 20 mm rear armor, all and exited the tank completely before burying itself in the jungle beyond. Chiha didn’t explode immediately like tanks did in movies and training films, and for maybe two seconds, nothing visible happened.

Flames erupted from the commander’s hatch as ammunition inside the tank began cooking off from the heat of the penetration, and the Japanese tank rolled forward another 20 yard under its own momentum before the driver either died or lost control. At burning chihaw veered off the trail and stopped with smoke pouring from every opening.

Morett’s first thought came as a single word that he didn’t transmit over the radio but would remember for the rest of his life. Weak. Next 17 minutes established a pattern that would reshape American armor doctrine throughout the Pacific theater and destroy the myth of Japanese tank superiority that had governed tactical decisions since the war began.

Mitchell reloaded and engaged the second chihaw in the column, hitting it at 550 yards as the Japanese tanks began reacting to the ambush and the second tank took a penetrating hit through the turret. The 37 mm round entering through the mantlet and destroying the gun breach before continuing through the crew compartment. Remaining six Japanese tanks attempted to deploy from column into line formation.

standard doctrine when ambushed, but the jungle terrain limited their maneuver space and the Americans were already firing. And the second steward and Moret’s platoon, commanded by Sergeant Robert Quinn, opened fire at 500 yd, scoring a penetrating hit on the third Chiha. A Japanese tanks began returning fire.

Their 57mm type 97 guns designed primarily for infantry support rather than anti-tank warfare. and the low velocity shells they fired proved effective against bunkers and field fortifications, but lacked the penetrating power to threaten the M3 Stewart’s frontal armor, which at its thickest points measured 51 mm, more than twice the thickness of the Chiha’s maximum armor.

A Moret watched a Japanese shell strike the ground 15 yards short of his Stewart, the round impacting soft earth and detonating without effect. and another round struck a tree to the left and exploded harmlessly. Japanese were shooting, but their weapons couldn’t reach effectively at 600 yards. And even if they closed the range, their guns likely couldn’t penetrate the Stewart’s armor at any practical combat distance.

Mitchell kept reloading and firing methodically, now working through the ammunition racks with the loader while the driver kept the Stewart positioned hole down behind a slight rise that protected the lower hole. And fourth Japanese tank hit at 450 yard, flames visible within seconds. Fifth tank hit at 400 yd as it attempted to reverse away from the ambush.

Third Stewart and Morett’s platoon engaged from a flanking position that catching the Japanese column from the side where the 20 mm side armor provided even less protection than the frontal armor and the flanking Stewart destroyed two Chihas in rapid succession. Both taking penetrating hits that resulted in catastrophic ammunition fires.

One Japanese chihaw broke from the column and charged directly toward Morett’s position. won the commander apparently deciding that closing to point blank range was the only option that might allow his 57 mm gun to penetrate American armor and the Chiha accelerated to its maximum speed of approximately 24 mph, closing the distance from 400 yd to 300 to 200.

Mitchell tracked the approaching tank calmly, waiting for Morett’s fire command. And at 100 yards, Morett could see individual details on the Japanese tank. All the commander’s head visible through the open hatch. The rising sun insignia painted on the turret. Fire. Force of the 37 mm round at 100 yards meant it penetrated the Chihaw’s front armor, destroyed everything inside the crew compartment, and punched completely through the rear armor before continuing another 100 yards into the jungle behind the Japanese tank. And the Chihaw rolled

forward from momentum. that closing to within 10 yards of Moret Stewart before the dead driver’s foot slipped off the accelerator and the tank stopped. Morett could see through the penetration hole, a ragged circle maybe 3 in in diameter where the American shell had entered the front armor, passed through the entire tank and exited the rear and the 37 mm gun at pointlank range hadn’t just penetrated the Chiha.

It had treated the Japanese tank’s armor like it wasn’t even there. At eighth and final chiha from the original column attempted to flee, reversing away from the ambush and trying to escape back down the trail it had advanced along and the flanking Stewart caught it at 600 yd with a shot through the rear armor, the weakest point on any tank.

Chiha burned like the others. Morett checked his watch. 0633 18 minutes since he’d given the order to engage. Eight Japanese tanks destroyed, zero American tanks damaged, or zero American casualties. And the battle had been so one-sided that it barely qualified as combat. Myth was dead, and truth emerged through the smoke of burning Japanese armor.

The Type 97 Chiha that American forces had feared for 3 weeks was a death trap with inadequate armor, an underpowered gun, and no capability to fight American tanks on anything approaching equal terms. Morett’s platoon held position for another 30 minutes. It’s waiting to see if additional Japanese tanks would appear, but the jungle remained quiet except for the sound of ammunition cooking off in the destroyed Chihas and the acrid smell of burning gasoline and rubber filled the morning air.

Battalion commander arrived at 0715 in a jeep escorted by infantry who were clearing the area around the destroyed Japanese tanks. Bake and Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Miller commanded the 192nd Tank Battalion and had issued the preservation doctrine that Morett had violated by choosing to engage. Miller surveyed the eight burning wrecks spread across 200 yards of Jungle Trail, walked close enough to one of the destroyed Chihas to examine the penetration damage, then returned to where Morett stood beside his steward. conversation

that followed would be recorded in multiple post-war accounts and memoirs, though the exact wording varied depending on who was telling the story, but the substance remained consistent across all versions. Miller asked Morett to explain what had happened, and Morett provided a tactical summary. Eight enemy tanks engaged at ranges from 600 to 10 yard, all eight destroyed.

American 37mm gun penetrated enemy armor at all ranges tested. Japanese 57mm gun appeared ineffective against Steuart frontal armor. Ult Miller asked if Morett felt certain about the penetration performance and Morett walked him to the closest destroyed Chihaw and pointed at the entry hole in the front armor and the exit hole in the rear armor and the 37 mm shell had gone completely through the tank.

Miller examined the armor thickness himself in using a measuring tape from his map case to verify that the Japanese tank’s armor sat substantially thinner than intelligence reports had indicated, 25 mm at the thickest points, less than half what American planners had estimated. Intelligence officer who accompanied Miller took photographs and made notes for the afteraction report.

and the technical analysis would take several days to compile, but the tactical implications were immediate and obvious. American M3 Stewart tanks were superior to Japanese type 97 Chihaha tanks in every measurable category. Armor thickness, gun penetration, crew protection, mechanical reliability, preservation doctrine that had governed American armor operations for 3 weeks rested on faulty assumptions about enemy capabilities.

And those faulty assumptions had been thoroughly disproven in 18 minutes of actual combat testing. When Miller asked Morett why he had chosen to engage when doctrine required withdrawal and Morett’s answer came direct and unambiguous. The tanks weren’t serving any purpose sitting in reserve while infantry died without armored support.

Someone needed to test whether the Japanese armor was actually as dangerous as everyone believed. And the only way to get accurate information was to fight. Miller listened. nodded or and issued new orders on the spot. The 192nd Tank Battalion would aggressively seek out Japanese armor, engage at every opportunity, and exploit the capabilities advantage that had just been demonstrated.

Preservation doctrine was finished. Word spread through the American defensive positions on Baton within hours, carried by infantry who had watched the engagement from their foxholes and by tank crews who heard the radio transmissions and Japanese tanks could be killed. and American guns could penetrate them easily.

The fear that had shaped tactical decisions for three weeks rested on incomplete information. Psychological impact came immediate and measurable. American morale improved. Japanese psychological advantage evaporated. The tactical situation shifted in ways that went beyond simple armor versus armor comparisons. Second engagement between American and Japanese armor came on January 16th, 1942.

One week after Morett’s platoon destroyed eight Chihaws and this time the numbers favored the Japanese even more heavily. Five M3 Stewarts against 12 type 97 Chiha tanks advancing in company strength with infantry support. American tank commander was Captain Donald Haynes, commanding company B of the 192nd Tank Battalion and positioned an ambush along the same coastal road where the first tank versus tank encounter had ended an American withdrawal on December 22nd.

And Haynes had studied Morett’s afteraction report and understood the capabilities mismatch between the two tank types. Japanese tanks advanced in column formation with infantry following several hundred yards behind. Standard doctrine for armored assault and terrain that limited maneuver space. Laen, the Japanese commander, clearly expected either no opposition or American forces that would withdraw rather than engage because the Chiha column made no tactical preparations for ambush.

Haynes opened the engagement at 700 yd, the maximum effective range for the M3 Stewart’s 37 mm gun against lightly armored targets, and all five American tanks fired within seconds of each other. Four of the five rounds achieved penetrating hits on the lead Japanese tanks. Japanese column disintegrated under the initial volley with tanks attempting to scatter in different directions while their commanders tried to identify where the fire was coming from and the infantry behind the tanks went to ground unable to provide effective support against

American armor that sat positioned whole down behind defensive terrain. Engagement lasted 28 minutes from first shot to last and the results reinforced everything Morett’s fight had demonstrated. American tanks destroyed nine Japanese chihas outright with penetrating hits that resulted in catastrophic fires, damaged three more severely enough that they were abandoned by their crews and suffered zero losses in return.

Japanese 57 mm guns scored hits on two M3 Stewarts during the engagement, but both shells failed to penetrate the American tank’s armor and one round struck the glac’s plate at an angle and ricocheted away without effect. Second round hit a Steuart’s turret and failed to penetrate, leaving a deep dent but causing no internal damage.

Japanese tank crews who survived the engagement and were later captured during the fall of Baton provided interrogation reports that fundamentally altered American understanding of enemy psychology and tactics. And the prisoners described the fight from their perspective. And watching American shells punch through their armor while their own weapons bounced harmlessly off American tanks.

Realizing their Type 97s were death traps that offered no protection against enemy fire. One captured Japanese tank commander stated through an interpreter that his crew had abandoned their Chiha after it was hit because staying in a burning tank meant certain death and facing American armor in a Type 97 felt like fighting without proper equipment.

And several Japanese prisoners expressed surprise that American forces had ever retreated from tank engagements since the Americans possessed obvious superiority. This intelligence made its way to higher command levels and contributed to a broader reassessment of Japanese capabilities throughout the Pacific theater.

And the reputation that had preceded Japanese forces wasn’t entirely fabricated. Oh, but it rested on performance against opponents who lacked the equipment to effectively counter Japanese tactics. Against properly equipped and employed American armor, Japanese tanks were overmatched. If you want to see how Morett proved this in the ultimate test while fighting wounded, hit that like button now.

Back to Beton, February 1942. Japanese understood by late January that their armor proved ineffective against American M3 Stewarts and began adapting their tactics accordingly. But adaptation options ran limited when the fundamental problem was technological inferiority that couldn’t be fixed in the field.

Japanese tank commanders started avoiding American armor entirely when possible, routing their advances through terrain where they believed American tanks couldn’t operate effectively. And this worked occasionally, but violated the principle that armor should lead offensive operations. Enforcing Japanese infantry to assault American defensive positions without tank support.

When avoiding American armor wasn’t possible, Japanese tactics shifted toward mass attacks that attempted to overwhelm American positions through sheer numbers. And the logic sounded solid in theory. Five American tanks might destroy eight or nine Japanese tanks. But if Japan committed 20 or 30 tanks to a single attack, some might survive to close with American positions.

A battle of Baton in early February 1942 would test this mass attack doctrine and provide the final data points that established American armor superiority as an unchallengeable fact rather than a promising hypothesis based on limited engagements. February 2nd, 1942, 0545 brought the Japanese Fourth Tank Regiment launching a coordinated assault with over 40 Type 97 Chiha tanks supported by infantry and artillery.

And the objective was breaking through American defensive lines on the Baton Peninsula and reaching Manila Bay, effectively splitting the American Filipino defensive position. 192nd Tank Battalion positioned 18 operational M3 Stewarts in defensive positions covering the most likely Japanese approach routes with Staff Sergeant Benjamin Morett’s platoon assigned to a section of trail where intelligence predicted heavy enemy armor activity.

Japanese tanks began their advance at 0530. Moving under cover of darkness with the intention of reaching American lines before dawn could expose them to effective defensive fire. And the plan assumed American forces would be unprepared for a pre-dawn armor assault and would need time to organize resistance.

Barplan failed to account for the fact that American tank crews had been expecting exactly this attack and had prepared positions overnight specifically to ambush Japanese armor at first light. and Moret’s three Stewarts sat positioned whole down with clear fields of fire covering 600 yards of trail with additional American tanks positioned on the flanks to catch the Japanese column from multiple directions.

The first Japanese tanks appeared as silhouettes against the pre-dawn sky at 0545 and more it held fire while counting the number of enemy vehicles. at least 12 chihas in the lead elements with more following behind. The largest concentration of Japanese armor he had encountered in a single engagement. Morett keyed his radio and transmitted to the other platoon covering adjacent sectors and reporting enemy armor and company strength and requesting confirmation that all American units were in position.

And the responses came back quickly, all positions ready, all fields of fire clear. Ambush opened at 0550 with coordinated fire from multiple American positions hitting the Japanese column simultaneously and Morat Stewart destroyed the lead Chiha with a penetrating hit at 500 yd. Within 30 seconds, another five Japanese tanks were burning from hits scored by the other American tanks in the kill zone.

Japanese infantry following the tanks scattered for cover as their armored support disintegrated under American fire and some Japanese tank commanders abandoned their vehicles before they were hit, preferring to take their chances on foot rather than staying in tanks they knew couldn’t protect them. Or engagement intensified as Japanese commanders realized they were in a prepared ambush and attempted to fight through rather than withdraw.

and additional chihas pushed forward trying to reach the American positions through volume of vehicles even as 37 millimeter shells destroyed them methodically. Morett’s gunner Mitchell fired as fast as the loader could supply ammunition, working through the ready racks and calling for additional rounds from the stored ammunition.

Yaw and the 37 mm guns barrel heated from sustained fire but remained operational. Stuart’s position behind defensive terrain protected it from most Japanese return fire. At 0623, a Japanese infantry squad worked its way close enough to Moret Stewart to engage with rifle grenades. Man portable weapons designed to be fired from standard infantry rifles and a grenade struck the commander’s cupula where Moret sat with his head partially exposed to maintain situational awareness.

An explosion caught Morett in the face and shoulder. Shrapnel fragments tearing through exposed skin and embedding themselves in his left shoulder and jaw and blood poured down his face, partially blinding him. Immediate shock of the impact made him lose his grip on the cupa hatch. Crew heard the explosion and immediately began shouting over the intercom, asking if he was hit and how badly, and whether they needed to evacuate the tank, and Morit could hear them through the ringing in his ears.

Nang could feel blood running down inside his uniform, could taste copper and smell cordite. Response over the intercom came brief and unambiguous. Keep loading. Mitchell continued firing with Morett directing targets despite his wounds, using his remaining vision and the blood smeared vision blocks to identify Japanese tanks that were still advancing.

And the loader passed ammunition from the racks while the driver maintained position. Next, Stuart continued fighting even though its commander bled from 11 separate fragment wounds. Morett stayed in position for another 3 hours as the battle continued around his platoon sector, directing fire and coordinating with other American tanks while his wounds slowly clotted and his uniform stiffened with dried blood.

And when the Japanese finally withdrew at 0930, Morett had personally directed the destruction of 10 Chiha tanks. that four destroyed before he was wounded and six more destroyed while fighting wounded. Overall engagement numbers told a story that would reshape American understanding of armor warfare in the Pacific.

18M three Stewarts against more than 40. Type 97 Chihaw resulted in 27 Japanese tanks destroyed outright. 12 more damaged severely enough to be abandoned and Japanese infantry suffering heavy casualties from American tank fire when their armor failed to suppress the defenders. Eight American losses were two M3 Stewarts damaged by Japanese fire, both repairable and returned to service within days, and zero American tanks destroyed.

Zero American tank crew members killed. Japanese Fourth Tank Regiment that had entered the battle as an effective fighting force was effectively destroyed as a cohesive unit with losses so severe that it never again operated at full strength during the Philippines campaign. Morett was evacuated from his tank at0945 when medics reached his position and saw the blood covering his uniform and equipment.

And the battalion surgeon counted 11 separate fragment wounds in Morett’s face, jaw, shoulder, and upper back. None of them immediately life-threatening, but several requiring surgical intervention to remove embedded fragments. surgeon wanted to evacuate Morett to the field hospital for treatment and recovery and estimating he would need at least 2 weeks before returning to duty and Morett’s response was that he would return to his tank as soon as the surgeon finished removing the fragments because his crew needed him and the war wasn’t going to wait for

him to heal completely. compromise came as three weeks of recovery during which Morett’s wounds healed enough to allow him to operate without risking infection or permanent damage and he returned to duty on February 23rd and rejoined his platoon in time for the final defensive battles before the fall of Baton in April 1942.

Tactical lessons from two months of American Japanese tank combat in the Philippines spread throughout the US military and influenced armor doctrine for the remainder of the Pacific War. Lesson one stated that Japanese tanks were optimized for fighting infantry and could not compete with American armor designed for anti-tank combat.

And the type 97 Chihaw’s thin armor and low velocity gun made it vulnerable to any American tank mounting a 37 millimeter or larger gun. And Japanese crews fighting in Chihas faced nearly hopeless odds. Lesson two established that psychological factors in armor warfare mattered as much as technical specifications. And American crews who believed Japanese tanks were superior fought defensively and retreated when outnumbered.

But American crews who understood the capabilities mismatch fought aggressively and won decisively even when outnumbered 3 to one or worse. Lesson three showed that aggressive engagement doctrine produced better results than preservation doctrine when equipment quality favored the aggressor and American tanks that sought out Japanese armor and engaged at every opportunity inflicted disproportionate losses while suffering minimal casualties.

But American tanks that remained in reserve waiting for ideal conditions never contributed meaningfully to defensive operations. These lessons were codified in revised armor doctrine issued by US Army forces far east in March 1942. Though the Philippines campaign was already entering its final phase and most American tanks would be destroyed or captured when Baton fell in April.

But the doctrine changes would benefit American armor units in subsequent campaigns throughout the Pacific. Japanese forces also drew lessons from their armor defeats in the Philippines. Though their response differed from American adaptation, and rather than developing better tanks or improving existing designs, Japanese doctrine shifted away from using tanks in offensive operations entirely.

Later, Pacific campaigns would see Japanese tanks dug into defensive positions and used as stationary gun imp placements rather than mobile offensive weapons. And this preserved the tanks from destruction in unequal engagements with American armor, but also meant Japan surrendered the tactical mobility that armor was designed to provide.

in the kill ratio that emerged from the Philippines campaign would hold relatively constant throughout the Pacific War and American tanks consistently destroyed Japanese tanks at ratios exceeding 10:1 with some engagements approaching 20 to1 or higher. Total Pacific War statistics show American armored forces destroyed over 1,000 Japanese tanks while losing fewer than 50 American tanks to Japanese tank fire in tank versus tank combat.

Yam3 Stewart’s 37 millimeter gun that American planners considered inadequate for European warfare against German armor proved more than sufficient against Japanese armor that had been designed for a completely different threat environment. And what seemed like a weakness in one theater became an overwhelming advantage in another.

Staff Sergeant Benjamin Moret survived the fall of Baton in April 1942, but could not escape the Philippines before Japanese forces completed their conquest. Yeah. and he was captured along with thousands of other American and Filipino soldiers and became a prisoner of war for the next 3 and 1/2 years.

Baton death march killed thousands of prisoners through a combination of brutality, disease and exhaustion. But Moret survived the forced march and the subsequent imprisonment in P camps and details of his captivity remain sparse in official records. Old though fellow survivors later described conditions that tested human endurance beyond anything they had experienced in combat.

Liberation came in 1945 when American forces returned to the Philippines and freed the surviving prisoners from Japanese camps and Morett weighed less than half his pre-war weight suffered from multiple tropical diseases and carried psychological scars that would affect him for the rest of his life.

return to the United States came in late 1945. A medical treatment followed for his combat wounds and imprisonment related health problems and he received the Silver Star for his actions during the tank battles of January and February 1942. And the citation specifically mentioned his decision to engage Japanese armor when outnumbered and his continued fighting after being wounded.

Morett chose not to remain in military service after the war, accepting his discharge and returning to civilian life in his home state of Ohio, and he married. Oz raised a family, worked in manufacturing, and rarely spoke about his combat experiences or his years as a prisoner of war. 192 Tank Battalion that Morett had served with was effectively destroyed during the Philippines campaign with most of its personnel killed in combat or dying in Japanese captivity.

and the unit was never reconstituted and its colors were retired in ceremonies that honored the sacrifice of men who had fought America’s first armored battles in the Pacific. N Morett maintained contact with a few surviving members of his tank crew and the 192nd Tank Battalion through veterans organizations and occasional reunions, but the gatherings became less frequent as the survivors aged and their numbers diminished.

Death came on November 3rd, 1989 at the age of 71 in Cleveland, Ohio. As an obituary in the Cleveland plane dealer noted his service in World War II and his time as a prisoner of war, but did not mention the tank battles where he had helped establish American armor superiority in the Pacific Theater. National Archives preserves the 192nd Tank Battalion’s records, including afteraction reports from the January and February 1942, engagements where Moret’s platoon destroyed 18 Japanese tanks, and military historians studying the Pacific War can trace the evolution of armor

doctrine through documents that bear his influence. M3 Stewart tanks that American forces deployed to the Philippines were obsolete by 1943 standards and were replaced by more capable designs throughout the war. But the lessons learned in those first tank versus tank engagements remained relevant.

The importance of aggressive tactics, the psychological impact of technical superiority, the need to test assumptions through actual combat rather than accepting intelligence estimates. All of these principles originated in the jungle trails of Baton where outnumbered American crews discovered they had nothing to fear. Japanese Type 97 Chiha tanks continued in service throughout the Pacific War despite their demonstrated inadequacy against American armor.

Yet because Japan lacked the industrial capacity to replace them with better designs and because withdrawing them entirely would leave Japanese forces without any armored support. And the result was that Japanese tank crews spent the war knowing they were operating equipment that offered minimal protection against enemy fire. Technological mismatch that Morett discovered at 600 yardds on January 9th, 1942 never closed.

Japanese armor remained vulnerable. American armor remained superior and the kill ratios remained lopsided until the wars end. Type 97 Chiha that seemed invincible in December 1941 was revealed as a death trap by January 1942. And that revelation came from men like Benjamin Morett who chose to test assumptions rather than accept them.

Who violated doctrine when doctrine was getting soldiers killed, who fought when conventional wisdom said to retreat. 37 millimeter gun that penetrated both sides of a Japanese tank at 10 yards was the same gun that American planners worried was inadequate for modern warfare. While and the thin armor that failed to stop American shells was the same armor that had dominated Chinese battlefields for years.

Context mattered. Equipment designed for one environment failed catastrophically in another. and assumptions based on reputation rather than testing produced tactical decisions that unnecessarily surrendered advantages. Every single like tells YouTube to show this story to more people who need to hear it. So, hit subscribe if you haven’t already as and turn on notifications because we bring you forgotten stories like this every single day.

Drop a comment right now and tell us where you’re watching from. United States, Japan, Philippines, Australia. Wherever you are in the world, you’re part of keeping these memories alive. So, tell us your location. Tell us if someone in your family served in the Pacific. Just let us know you’re here. Thank you for watching East.

And thank you for making sure Benjamin Morett and the men of the 192nd Tank Battalion are not forgotten because these tankers proved that fear was the real enemy. And Japanese armor was never invincible. It just seemed that way until someone tested it.

Note: Some content was generated using AI tools (ChatGPT) and edited by the author for creativity and suitability for historical illustration purposes.